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Abstract
Esterel is a synchronous language for reactivesystems design and builds the core of
the commercial tool Esterel Studio This paper shows how the constructive seman
tics of a combinational fragment of Esterel as presented by Berry can be derived in
a modeltheoretic fashion thus complementing the existing behavioral operational
and circuitbased approaches to Esterel semantics Technically Esterel programs
are read as formulas in propositional intuitionistic logic which are interpreted over
simple linear Kripke structures referred to as Godel valuations Esterel reactions
are then characterized as specic Godel valuations called response models and it
is shown that the approach is compositional in the structure of Esterel programs
The obtained results are an important step towards explaining the logic behind
Esterel semantics In addition the intuitionistic setting advocated in this paper
nicely links to Pnueli and Shalevs semantics of Harels Statecharts another syn
chronous language for reactivesystems design This oers interesting insights into
the similarities of and the dierences between Esterel and Statecharts semantics
 Introduction
Esterel is a textual imperative language for specifying the behavior of reac
tive systems developed by Berry since the s 	
 The language provides
primitives for decomposing reactions sequentially and concurrently where con
current reactions might involve a complex exchange of signals
 The semantics
of Esterel is based on the idea of cyclebased reaction where rst the statuses
of the input signals as dened by a systems environment are sampled at the

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beginning of each cycle then the systems reaction in the form of the emis
sion of further signals is determined and nally the new signal statuses are
output to the environment
 The semantics of Esterel has signicantly evolved
over the years and is designed around the key principles of synchrony reac
tivity determinism and causality 	
 The synchrony requirement reects
the mechanism behind cyclebased reaction and is mathematically modeled
via the perfect synchrony hypothesis
 This hypothesis ensures that reactions
and the propagations of signals are instantaneous which is an idealized sys
tem behavior that is nevertheless often reected in practice reactive systems
usually perform much faster than their environments
 Determinism demands
reactions to be uniquely determined by the system environments inputs
 This
is a property very much desired since nondeterministic systems are often dif
cult to understand sometimes encountered system bugs might even not be
reproducible
 Causality refers to the requirement that the reason for a sig
nal being emitted or not emitted in a system reaction can be traced back to
the input signals provided by the environment
 While this property is very
natural it is quite hard to enforce in a simple mathematical way
 In earlier
approaches to Esterel semantics causality was dealt with in a preprocess
ing step only Esterel programs were considered which could be shown to be
causal by means of a static analysis 	
 Such static checks however compute
approximations of causality and sometimes reject programs that are perfectly
causal from a semantic point of view
 In his recent draft book 	 Berry
describes a much improved version of Esterel semantics that is founded on
the idea of constructiveness and that encodes the principle of causality in a
precise not an approximative way
 Berry also established the coincidence of
three constructive styles of Esterel semantics a behavioral or xedpoint se
mantics an operational semantics and a circuit semantics thereby testifying
to the mathematical elegance and robustness of the latest version of Esterel
semantics
 Today this constructive semantics builds the core of the commer
cial design tool Esterel Studio which is employed by major companies in the
avionics and communications industry wwwestereltechnologiescom

In this paper we present a novel modeltheoretic account of Esterel seman
tics for a fragment of the language concerned with instantaneous reactions

Our approach reads Esterel programs as simple propositional formulas in intu
itionistic logic which correspond to the must and cannot functions as dened
in Berrys behavioral semantics 	
 These functions determine which sig
nals must and respectively cannot be emitted relative to some given statuses
present or absent of the input signals
 Our propositional formulas are in
terpreted in an intuitionistic way over twoworld linear Kripke structures 	
to which we refer as Godel valuations
 In this setting we obtain our two main
results
 We rst characterize valid Esterel reactions as specic Godel valua
tions that respect the principle of causality
 In addition we show that our
approach is compositional in the structure of Esterel programs which is one
of the virtues of Berrys behavioral semantics
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The motivations for the suggested modeltheoretic approach to Esterel
semantics are threefold
 To begin with our results provide a rst step towards
explaining the logic behind Esterels constructive semantics
 Although Berry
considers a semantics based on the threevalued Scott domain in his book
that approach leads to an algebraic rather than a logical semantics
 Secondly
our intuitionistic modeltheoretic approach links Esterels semantics to the
original variant of Statecharts semantics 	 as conceived by Pnueli and
Shalev 	
 Like Esterel Statecharts 	 is a popular language for reactive
systems design which obeys the perfect synchrony hypothesis and causality

However Statecharts permits nondeterminism and nonreactivity and signal
statuses might be inferred by speculation
 In this light our results suggest a
way for extending Esterel by a concept of nondeterminism
 This is of particular
importance when interfacing Esterel with design or verication methodologies
many of which are based on abstraction or renement techniques
 Third our
setting might be used for establishing fullabstractness results for Esterel
similar to the ones obtained for Statecharts 	

 Esterel and its Behavioral Semantics
We rst present the simple but nontrivial combinational fragment of Esterel
that will be considered in the remainder and recall its constructive behavioral
semantics as dened in 	
 This semantics is essentially a xedpoint seman
tics which we will then characterize in terms of separability a notion that is
adapted from Statecharts where it is employed for encoding causality 	

Syntax and behavioral semantics The fragment of Esterel we are in
terested in deals with instantaneous reactions i
e
 single reaction cycles
 Its
syntax is dened by the following BNF where s stands for a signal name taken
from some nite universe S

P   nothing
j s emit s
j sP  present s then P
j sP  present s else P
j P jP PP
In analogy to digital circuits we refer to programs in this fragment as combina
tional programs
 Esterels more general choice statement present s then P
else Q can be recovered in our syntax by the term sP  j sQ

Treating the then and elsebranches separately will prove to be notationally
convenient lateron
 In this paper we omit the combinational operators for
sequential composition and signal denition
 A consequence of this omission
is that the completion codes needed in the behavioral semantics denition for
the full language 	 become obsolete
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The constructive behavioral semantics uses a xedpoint construction on
socalled partial events
 A partial event is simply a consistent set E of signal
statuses of the form s and s in particular for any signal s set E is
not allowed to contain both s and s
 Status s represents the fact
that s is positively known to be present while status s means that s is
positively known to be absent
 Signals not in E have an unknown status
 A
partial event E is called complete if it contains either s or s for every
signal s
 One can consider partial events as intuitionistic valuations of signals
and complete events as their classical twovalued completion

The behavior of an Esterel program P is usually studied with respect to an
event E
I
determining the status of all input signals i  I  fi

     i
n
g  S

In this paper we do away with distinguished input signals thereby simplifying
our presentation
 This is possible since the behavior of P under I is equivalent
to the behavior of P j i
j

j    j i
j
m
 where the indexes j

     j
m
 f     ng
are exactly those for which i
j
k
  E
I

 The standard Esterel semantics as
well as the modeltheoretic semantics developed here are fully compatible
with this point of view
 We now reproduce Berrys denitions of the Must
and Cannot functions over partial events 	 which are inductively dened as
follows where S

denotes the set fs j s  Sg

Must	
 E   Must	s	P  E 

Must	PE if s  E
 otherwise
Must	sE  fsg Must	s	P  E 

Must	PE if s  E
 otherwise
Must	P jQE Must	PE Must	QE
Cannot	
 E S

Cannot	s	P  E 

S

if s  E
Cannot	PE otherwise
Cannot	sE S

nfsg Cannot	s	P  E 

S

if s  E
Cannot	PE otherwise
Cannot	P jQE Cannot	PE  Cannot	QE
Intuitively MustPE and CannotPE where P is a combinational Esterel
program and E is a partial event denote the partial events including all sig
nals that P must and cannot emit respectively relative to E
 As expected
the Must and Cannot functions satisfy the property  s s  MustPE
and s  CannotPE for any P and E
 Moreover both functions are
monotonic in E
 With these auxiliary denitions we can now state Esterels
constructive behavioral semantics
 Every program P denes a monotonic
function P 		 on partial events P 		O  MustPO  CannotPO
 We
say that P 		 is the response function of P 
 If O is the least xedpoint of P 		
then O is called the response of P  written P  O
 Moreover program P is
called constructive if O is complete
 Observe that the response P  O is on
partial events O
 The constructive behavioral semantics of Esterel however
is only that subrelation of  where O is complete written P  O
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Let us illustrate this semantics by means of an example
 Consider the
program P  aab j ac j bd
 Although in this ex
ample none of the signals a b c d has an unguarded emit it still produces
the constructive response P  fa b c dg
 Here and elsewhere
we omit from the response all absent signals that do not syntactically oc
cur in the program at hand
 The rst iteration of the xedpoint con
struction gives P 			  fag since P does not contain an emit state
ment for signal a i
e
 CannotP 	  fag
 Then the second iteration
decides the two left most signal guards and identies P with c j bd
which produces P 		fag  fa b cg
 A third iteration yields
P 		fa b cg  fa b c dg the desired xedpoint

The example demonstrates two salient features of the constructive seman
tics which deserve to be highlighted
 Firstly the xedpoint construction
corresponds to the derivation of logical consequences regarding the presence
and absence of signals
 This deductive closure implements a causality chain
of abstract signal propagations
 Only those facts that can positively be deter
mined from the specication of the system in nitely many steps are considered
in the nal response
 Secondly there is an asymmetry in the treatment of pos
itive and negative signal facts
 While the presence of signals is always derived
from emit statements explicitly contained in the program text the absence of
a signal is inferred indirectly from the absence of emits
 This amounts to a
form of default assumption that is also known from Statecharts namely that
signals are assumed to be absent whenever it is safe to do so 	
 Both lan
guages however dier in what they consider safe more will be said about
this in Sec
 
 In the above example a is considered absent outright since
it positively cannot be emitted by the program
 Moreover b is absent since
a and thus the emit b in aab is positively not reachable

Inseparability and admissibility In analogy to Pnueli and Shalevs declar
ative semantics for Statecharts 	 we dene a notion of inseparability
 It pro
vides for an alternative characterization of the minimality condition of the
least xedpoint of P 		 which will be useful for our modeltheoretical anal
ysis
 A xedpoint O is called inseparable for P if P 		O

 
 O n O

  	
for all O

 O
 Hence O is inseparable if it does not contain any proper
subset O

that is closed under P 		
 Informally this requires O to be internally
causal with respect to the response function i
e
 every signal status in O has
a causal justication in terms of iterated applications of P 		 cf
 	

Proposition  Let O be a xedpoint of P 		 for some Esterel program P 
Then O is inseparable for P if and only if O is the least xedpoint of P 		
Proof For direction  suppose that O is an inseparable xedpoint and
thatO

is another xedpoint
 Assume further O  O

 i
e
 O
O

 O
 Then
because of the inseparability of O there exists some s  O n O
O

  O nO

with s  P 		O 
 O


 Since P 		 is monotonic P 		O 
 O

  P 		O

  O



Hence we derive O nO

 
 O

 	 which is a contradiction
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For direction  suppose that O is the least xed point and that O

 O
is a proper subset
 Assume further that O is obtained by the approximation
chain P 		

	  P 		

	  P 		

	      P 		
n
	  O where P 		

	  	
and P 		
i
	  P 		P 		
i
	
 Let k be the largest index with P 		
k
	  O



Then   k  n and P 		
k
	
OnO

  	
 By monotonicity P 		
k
	  O

implies P 		
k
	  P 		O


 Thus there exists some s  O n O

such that
s  P 		O


 But this implies that O is inseparable as desired
 
Following Pnueli and Shalevs terminology we call a partial event O admissible
for P  if O is an inseparable xedpoint of P 		
 Hence by Prop
 
 admissi
bility for Esterel coincides with the least xedpoint property
 The notion of
admissibility can also be used for nonmonotonic response functions such as
those involved in Statecharts where least xedpoints do not always exist 	

 A ModelTheoretic Semantics for Esterel
In this section we give a modeltheoretic characterization of the behavioral
semantics of combinational Esterel programs
 First such programs are read
as formulas in propositional logic essentially by translating the Must and
Cannot functions into predicates
 These formulas are then interpreted in the
style of intuitionistic logics over simple linear Kripke structures to which we
refer as Godel valuations

Intuitionistic logic translation We associate with each combinational
program P and each signal s two predicates MustP s and CannotP s
whose intuitionistic modeltheoretic semantics precisely captures the Must
and Cannot functions
 The atomic propositions employed in these predicates
besides true and false are the signal statuses s and s with the obvious
interpretations
 We start o with the MustP s predicate for a signal s which
is dened along the structure of P 
 Intuitively MustP s should hold exactly
if P must emit signal s i
e
 s is driven  in P and hence the statement s
becomes true

Must	
 s  false
Must	a s 

true if a  s
false otherwise
Must	a	P  s  a  Must	P s
Must	a	P  s  a  Must	P s
Must	P jQ s  Must	P s  Must	Q s
Obviously MustP s does not say anything about when s is driven  i
e

when s should be true
 Because of the asymmetry between  and  in
Esterel this needs some care
 In contrast to  the signal value  is a weak
kind of value in the sense that s is held at  only in so far as neither P nor
its environment emits s
 In other words  is a default value only
 For this
reason we cannot use the validity of s directly in order to express that s is
kept at 
 For if our logical specication of P would allow us to infer s in
some situation then value  could no longer be overridden by some emit since
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s s is logically inconsistent
 However we can dene a weaker default
pulldown of s by the formula s  s  s where  stands for
logical implication
 It states that if s is true i
e
 if we are positively sure
that s will never be emitted then s is true
 Otherwise nothing is known
about the status of s
 Note that while s  s is inconsistent s  s
is equivalent to s as desired
 Thus a weak  still permits s to be emitted

We now turn our attention to the CannotP s predicate whose denition
requires us to decide in which situations one may specify a default pulldown
of s
 If we simply specied s for any signal s then s is equivalent to
s i
e
 a signal is absent if and only if it will never become present which
would essentially give us a Statechartslike semantics
 Such an approach
however rules out the possibility that a signal value is truly undened i
e

neither s nor s is valid
 Yet the eminent truthvalue gap is an essen
tial feature of Esterel which reects its circuit semantics 	 there one needs
to account for subtle electrical phenomena such as metastability and signal
oscillations which can occur in synchronous circuits with asynchronous feed
back
 In Esterel semantics one may only conclude that signal s is  when P
cannot emit s which is stronger than saying that P just happens not to emit s

The predicate CannotP s is the formalization of this stronger statement it
is dened along the structure of P 

Cannot	
 s  true
Cannot	a s 

true if a  s
false otherwise
Cannot	a	P  s  a  Cannot	P s
Cannot	a	P  s  a  Cannot	P s
Cannot	P jQ s  Cannot	P s  Cannot	Q s
Then the translation SpecP  of a combinational Esterel program P into
propositional logic simply is
Spec	P  

sS
	Must	P s 	 s  	Cannot	P s 	 s
 
Before formally dening our modeltheoretic semantics we consider a simple
example P

 s

s

 j s


 According to the above denitions we
derive the following propositional formula for SpecP

 considering only those
signals that actually occur in P


Spec	P

  			s

  false  false 	 s

  			s

  true  true 	 s



 			s

  true  true 	 s

  			s

  false  false 	 s



In the spirit of modeltheoretic semantics one would rst consider the mod
els of SpecP

 according to classical propositional logic
 In this case one
would obtain the classical models fs

 s

g and fs

 s

g
 However
only the former describes a valid response in Esterel
 The latter models con
clusion s

 is not causally justied it seems to come from nowhere
 Note
that the classical model fs

 s

g is also minimal since no proper subset
is a classical model
 Hence the classical logical semantics of our specica
tion SpecP

 is not expressive enough for explaining the Esterel semantics
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of P


 In the remainder we show that intuitionistic logic with its richer model
structure is suited to identify those classical models of SpecP

 that indeed
correspond to valid Esterel responses

Intuitionistic semantics and Godel valuations The structures we con
sider for evaluating our propositional formulas intuitionistically are linear
Kripke structures of length two over partial events
 We refer to these struc
tures as Godel valuations since Godel was the rst to study this class of
structures as possible truth values for intuitionistic logic
 More precisely a
Godel valuation is a pair E

 E

 of partial events such that E

 E


 Intu
itively E

 E

 validates s if and only if s  E

 and it validates s if
and only if s  E


 The second component E

is used for interpreting nega
tion E

 E

 validates s if and only if s  E

 and E

 E

 validates
s if and only if s  E


 Then E

 E

 is a model of SpecP  written
E

 E

 j SpecP  if E

 E

 validates formula SpecP  in the intuition
istic sense 	
 Formally for a monotonically increasing sequence of partial
events K  E

 E

     E
n
 and index   i  n we dene the intuitionistic
validity of some formula  in K at index i along the structure of  as follows
K i j true always
K i j false never
K i j s i s  E
i
K i j s i s  E
i
K i j  i Kn j 
K i j    i K i j  and K i j 
K i j    i K i j  or K i j 
K i j  	  i j  i K j j  implies K j j 
Then K j  if K  j 
 This denition implies that all Godel valuations
satisfy ss for any signal s
 An important special case is when both
components are identical i
e
 E

 E


 Then E

 E

 also satises the classi
cal axioms of the Excluded Middle ss and ss
 Therefore
we call such valuations classical
 Another special case of a Godel valuation
occurs if the second component E

is a complete event i
e
 if for all signals s
either s  E

or s  E


 Then we have E

 E

 j s  s
which means that s is eventually driven to either  or 
 When E

 E

 j 
we call E

 E

 a Godel model of 
 Having formally dened the semantics we
may simplify the propositional formula SpecP

 of our example program P



Using  to denote semantical equivalence we nd SpecP

  s

  s



It is easy to check that the Godel valuations fs

 s

g fs

 s

g
fs

g fs

 s

g and fs

 s

g fs

 s

g are precisely the
twoworld models sequences of length  of SpecP


 Both fs

 s

g
and fs

 s

g are classical models sequences of length  of SpecP


but only one of them fs

 s

g is an actual response of P 

We conclude this section by considering some of the illuminating examples
given in Berrys book 	
 For each example we state its corresponding sim
plied propositional formula as well as the formulas Godel models relative
to the domain of signal names occurring in the example program
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
P

 ss jss
Spec	P

 		s  s 	 s  		s  s 	 s

 		s  s 	 s  	false 	 s

 s 	 s  s
Models  	  	 fsg 	fsg fsg

P

 ss
Spec	P

 	s 	 s  	s 	 s
  s  true  s
Models  	  	 fsg 	fsg fsg

P

 ss
Spec	P

 	s 	 s  	s 	 s
  true  true  true
Models  	  	 fsg 	 fsg 	fsg fsg 	fsg fsg

P

 s

s

 js

s


Spec	P

 	s

 	 s

  	s

 	 s


 
	s

 	 s

  	s

 	 s



Models  	  	 fs

 s

g 	fs

 s

g fs

 s

g
	 fs

 s

g 	fs

 s

g fs

 s

g
We now formally state that the Must and Cannot predicates correctly encode
the Must and Cannot functions as suggested in the previous section

Proposition  Let E

 E be a Godel valuation P a combinational pro
gram and s  S
i E

 E j MustP s if and only if s  MustPE


ii E

 E j CannotP s if and only if s  CannotPE


The proofs of both statements of this proposition are not di cult and proceed
by induction on the structure of P 

Modeltheoretic characterization As demonstrated earlier not every
minimal classical model of the propositional formula SpecP  corresponds to
a valid response of P according to Esterels behavioral semantics
 This is due
to the fact that SpecP  implicitly contains negations in the propositions s

The right notion is that of a response model which turns out to characterize
exactly the desired Esterel responses

Denition  Let P be a combinational Esterel program and E be a partial
event
 Then E is a response model of SpecP  if  EE j SpecP  i
e

E is a classical model of SpecP  and if  E

 E for all Godel valuations
E

 E with E

 E j SpecP 

Note that this denition heavily borrows from our intuitionistic interpretation
of SpecP  and is adapted from an earlier paper by the authors on the se
mantics of Statecharts 	
 It guarantees that the considered models are not
only classical models but also respect the principle of causality
 In order to
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see this consider a Godel evaluation E

 E such that E

 E j SpecP 

Intuitively if E

 E then the proper inclusion E

 E corresponds to a
noncausal reaction in the construction of E implying that some of the ad
ditional signal statuses in E n E

have been introduced due to some external
eect and are not solely causally dependent on the ones in E


 On the other
hand if there is no Godel valuation ending in E other than EE itself then
all signal statuses in E must be causally justied
 We should point out again
that without negations in SpecP  the notions of response model and minimal
classical model coincide
 The importance of stating signal absence as s will
be further highlighted in Sec
 

For example the Godel valuation fs

g fs

 s

g is an intuition
istic model of SpecP

 for our program P

 s

s

 j s

 which is a
witness to the fact that fs

 s

g although a minimal classical model is
not a response model
 Indeed Esterels declarative semantics rejects the emis
sion of s

since it is not causally justied
 The assertion of signal s

cannot be
inferred from the partial event fs

g
 On the other hand fs

 s

g is
a response model for SpecP

 and it is as well a valid response in Esterel

Similarly one can check that only the empty set is a response model of P

 P


P

 and P


 Since the response 	 is not complete these programs are rejected
by the Esterel compiler

Theorem  	Characterization
 Let P be a combinational program and
O be a partial event Then P  O i O is a response model of SpecP 
Thus O is a constructive Esterel response for P  i
e
 P  O if and only if
O is complete and a response model of SpecP 

Proof By Prop
 
 it is su cient to prove that O is a response model of
SpecP  if and only if O is admissible for P 
 We start o with the direction
response model  admissible
 Given a response model O of SpecP  we
prove that O is admissible by showing the following
i s  O implies s  Mustp O iii P 		O  O
ii s  O implies s  Cannotp O iv O is inseparable for P
From Statements i and ii we get O  P 		O which together with State
ment iii shows that O is a xedpoint of P 		
 Note that Statements iiv
are equivalent to O being admissible for P  which in turn is equivalent by
Prop
 
 to O being the least xedpoint of P 		

i Let s  O and O

 Onfsg
 Since O is a response model we know
OO j SpecP  and O

 O j SpecP 
 It is not di cult to show that the
assumption OO j SpecP  and thus OO j
V
a
CannotP a  a
implies O

 O j
V
a
CannotP a  a as well
 This is due to the fact that
the dierence between O

andO is a positive signal s and that this dierence
does not change validity of any a predicate and that CannotP a can only
become false so the implication CannotP a  a can only become more
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true
 Hence we must have O

 O j MustP a  a for some signal a and
this can only be a  s
 This means O

 O j MustP s
 From Prop
 
i
we conclude s  MustPO

  MustPO

ii Here we are looking at a negative signal s  O which we remove in
O

 O n fsg
 Since O is a response model O

 O j SpecP 
 The only
possibility for this to be the case is if O

 O j CannotP s and O

 O j
s
 This is due to the fact that none of the implications MustP a  a
for any signal a and none of the implications CannotP a  a for any
signal a  s can become false in reducing O to O

by removing the negative
signal status s from O
 But O

 O j CannotP s implies by Prop
 
ii
s  CannotPO

  CannotPO

iii Let s  P 		O i
e
 s  MustPO
 Apply Prop
 
i with
E

 E  O to derive OO j MustP s
 Since OO j
V
a
MustP a 
a this implies OO j s whence s  O
 Further let s  P 		O
i
e
 s  CannotPO
 From Prop
 
ii we get OO j CannotP s

Since by assumption OO j
V
a
CannotP a  a this implies OO j
s
 Hence s  b  O for some b  f g
 Now consider O

 O n fs  bg

Then O

 O j SpecP  as O is a response model
 But this must be because
O

 O j CannotP s  s since we must have O

 O j MustP s 
s
 For otherwise by Prop
 
i s  MustPO which contradicts
s  CannotPO
 Now O

 O j CannotP s  s implies O

 O j
s which can only be if b  
 Thus s  O as desired

iv To show that O is inseparable let O

 O be given
 Because O is a re
sponse model O

 O j SpecP 
 Suppose then O

 O j
V
a
MustP a 
a
 Since OO j
V
a
MustP a  a Prop
 
i implies there exists
some s  O

such that s  MustPO

  P 		O


 Furthermore by
monotonicity of Must  we have s  MustPO
 By another application of
Prop
 
i then we infer s  O
 This shows that s  P 		O


OnO



It remains to consider the case O

 O j CannotP s  s for some s

Since OO j CannotP s  s this can only be because O

 O j
CannotP s and s  O nO

 this follows from the intuitionistic semantics

The former implies s  CannotPO

  P 		O

 by Prop
 
ii
 So in
the second case too we nd that P 		O

 
 O nO

  	

We now prove direction admissible  response model
 Let O be ad
missible for P  i
e
 O  P 		O and P 		O

 
 O

n O  	 for all O

 O

We claim that O is a response model of SpecP  i
e
 OO j SpecP  and
O

 O j SpecP  for all O

 O

First let us check that OO j SpecP 
 It is easy to show that OO j
CannotP s  s for all signals s
 For if OO j CannotP s then
s  CannotPO by Prop
 
ii
 Thus s  P 		O  O whence
OO j s
 Similarly OO j MustP s  s for all signals s by
Prop
 
ii the premise OO j MustP s implies s  MustPO 
P 		O
 Since O  P 		O we have s  O and thus OO j s

Next let O

 O be given
 Because of the property of admissibility
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P 		O


OnO

 is nonempty
 Suppose there is some s  P 		O


OnO



Then s  MustPO

 and s  O n O

 whence by Prop
 
i
O

 O j MustP s
 Since s  O

 we have O

 O j s and thus
O

 O j SpecP 
 On the other hand suppose there is some s  P 		O



O n O

 i
e
 s  CannotPO

 and s  O n O


 The former implies
O

 O j CannotP s by Prop
 
ii
 The latter implies O

 O j s

Hence O

 O j SpecP  and O is a response model of SpecP 
 
A note on compositionality We showed above how to derive a propo
sitional formula SpecP  for a given combinational program P 
 This was
done with the help of the predicates Must and Cannot both of which are
dened via structural induction on P  which lead to the logical specication
SpecP s  MustP s  s  CannotP s  s for every signal s
 The
formula SpecP s itself however is not declared directly along the structure
of P  yet
 Here we show that SpecP s can indeed be dened structurally for
the constructive responses under the additional assumption that every signal
stabilizes eventually i
e
 s  s for all signals s

Theorem  Let PQ be combinational programs and s be a signal Then
Spec	P jQ s  	M

	 s  	C

	 s

Spec	a	P  s  	M

	 s  	C

	 s

Spec	a	Q s  	M

	 s  	C

	 s

are valid semantic equivalences where
M

 	Spec	P s 	 s  	Spec	Q s 	 s
C

 	Spec	P s 	 s
  	Spec	Q s 	 s

M

 a  	Spec	P s 	 s
C

 a  		Spec	P s  Spec	P s 	 s

M

 a  	Spec	Q s 	 s
C

 a  		Spec	Q s  Spec	Q s 	 s

Proof 	Sketch
 The observation underlying the inductive characterization
is that MustP s can be recovered from SpecP s as SpecP s  s and
that CannotP s can be recovered as SpecP s  SpecP s  s

Using case analysis one veries the equivalences
Must	P s  s 	Spec	P s 	 s  s
Must	P s  s 	Spec	P s 	 s  s
from which MustP s  SpecP s  s follows
 To show CannotP s 
SpecP s  SpecP s  s we use a fourfold case analysis
Cannot	P s  s  Must	P s 
		Spec	P s  Spec	P s 	 s
  s  Must	P s
Cannot	P s  s  Must	P s 
		Spec	P s  Spec	P s 	 s
  s  Must	P s
Cannot	P s  s  Must	P s 
		Spec	P s  Spec	P s 	 s
  s  Must	P s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Cannot	P s  s  Must	P s 
		Spec	P s  Spec	P s 	 s
  s  Must	P s
The details of these proofs are not too di cult but tedious
 For the last of these
equivalences one also needs the fact that MustP s  CannotP s
 
 Discussion and Related Work
This section discusses our modeltheoretic approach to Esterel semantics in
the light of related work with a focus on the semantic relation between Esterel
and Statecharts
 The intuitionistic semantics presented in this paper has pre
viously been used by the authors to characterize Pnueli and Shalevs step se
mantics for the parallel combinational fragment of Statecharts 	 which is not
equipped with an explicit nondeterministicchoice construct
 More precisely
it is shown in 	 that if every Statecharts transition a

     a
l
 b

     b
m

c

     c
n
is read as an implication a

  a
l
b

  b
m
  c

  c
n

and parallel composition as conjunction then the Godel models of the result
ing Statecharts formula provide a compositional and fullyabstract semantics
for Pnueli and Shalevs macro steps
 This semantic interpretation is general
ized to the full Statecharts language in 	

In the present paper we use the same modeltheoretic principles to char
acterize the reactive semantics of combinational Esterel programs in terms
of propositional logic formulas
 From the point of view of our model the
ory Esterel can now be seen as a renement of Statecharts and Statecharts
as a specialization of Esterel
 To be precise the parallel fragment of State
charts coincides with the special Esterel theory for combinational programs
in which for all signals s the axiom s is assumed
 Indeed if we add
the axiom s to our logic then the implications CannotP s  s in
SpecP  all collapse to true and s becomes equivalent to s
 We may
then simply identify a with the name a and consider a as a propositional
atom
 For example the program abc would thus translate up
to logical equivalence into the formula a  b  c which has the
same semantics as the Statecharts transition a bc
 Similarly one can show
that under the axioms s parallel composition reduces to conjunction i
e

SpecP

jP

  SpecP

SpecP

 so that Esterel collapses to Statecharts

Another interesting way to look at the relationship between Esterel and
Statecharts is to observe that the translation SpecP  essentially oers a
faithful embedding of Esterel into Statecharts
 Consider the program P 
aba j b
 Its translation yields modulo some trivial simplications
Spec	P  		a  b 	 a  		b  a 	 a 
	a 	 b  		a  b 	 b
which corresponds to the Statecharts program
a ba j b aa j ab j a bb 
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Our results now imply that the execution of this program in Statecharts un
der arbitrary external inputs yields exactly the same responses as if P was
executed under the xedpoint semantics of Esterel
 Note that in this execu
tion of SpecP  under the operational semantics of Statecharts any additional
assumption of the form s which translates into the Statecharts transition
ss eectively allows us to speculate on the absence of s at any time
in the construction of a Statecharts response
 As pointed out above it is the
omission of these assumptions that makes Esterel a renement of Statecharts

Moreover our framework oers the possibility to mix Esterel and Statecharts
consistently we can introduce s selectively for those signals that we wish
to subject to a speculative Statecharts regime while for all other signals
we keep the strict rule of Esterel that forces the absence of a signal to be
justied in a constructive nonspeculative way
 In this context it is worth
noting that the nondeterminism in Statecharts parallel fragment is solely due
to negations without negative triggers parallel Statecharts programs would
be deterministic like Esterel programs
 Note also that the smooth integration
of Esterel and Statecharts outlined above seems to depend crucially on the
use of weak signal absence s and hence the use of negation
 It is because
of negations that the intuitionistic viewpoint comes into play

A quite dierent way of giving a logical account of Esterel is to encode
or axiomatize Esterels semantics directly in a suitable predicate logic
 For
instance in 	 the semantics is formalized in the constructive higherorder
logic of the Calculus of Constructions and its implementation in Coq was used
to verify the correctness of Berrys circuit translation 	 for a large fragment
of Esterel
 To achieve these results the approach taken in 	 uses a deep
embedding in the Calculus of Constructions
 Our translation corresponds to
a shallow embedding and it is an embedding in propositional rather than in
higherorder logic
 Our approach is also distinct from Berrys logical seman
tics of constructive value propagation Chap
 
 in 	
 This semantics
for Esterel circuits is presented in terms of a predicate I R  e  b with the
interpretation for input I and register	 state R the propositional expres
sion e built from wires and constant values	 constructively evaluates to the
Boolean value b
 The predicate I R  e  b is an inductive relation dened
by a set of derivation rules similar to a logic calculus
 The relationship of this
calculus with our logic translation still needs to be investigated

Let us nally mention a couple of other open problems that we hope to
address in future work
 Firstly while we have shown compositionality of our
modeltheoretic semantics for Esterel the fullabstractness question is still
open
 We conjecture that two Esterel programs P and Q have the same
partial responses in all contexts if and only if SpecP  and SpecQ have the
same Godel models
 Secondly note that we have veried the compositionality
of SpecP  in the structure of P only relative to a xed signal i
e
 we have
shown how to construct the models of SpecP jQ s from those of SpecP s
and SpecQ s for any xed signal s
 One might also try to obtain the
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models of SpecP j Q from those of SpecP  and SpecQ
 Thirdly our
modeltheoretic semantics needs to be extended to cover other combinational
operators of Esterel in particular local signal declarations

 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented a novel modeltheoretic account of the semantics of a
combinational fragment of Esterel which complements the declarative oper
ational and circuitbased approaches in 	
 Our technical setting is based
on propositional intuitionistic logic where formulas are interpreted over Godel
valuations
 The obtained characterization of Esterel semantics via Godel mod
els suggests that the simple approach of explaining signal statuses in a three
valued Scott domain which leads to a Kleenestyle algebraic semantics as
detailed in 	 may not be su ciently expressive it is too coarse since it only
provides an algebra of signal values but not of truth values
 In this light our
results promise to be a signicant step forward in nding a native logic for
Esterel thereby explaining what kind of constructive logic Esterel is based on

Regarding future work we plan to extend our results to a richer Esterel
fragment
 Moreover our approach is expected to yield an axiomatization of
Esterel reactions on the basis of a latticetheoretic characterization of those
Godel valuations that arise with respect to Esterel semantics
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